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Abstract
We obtain modal completeness of the interpretability logics ILP0 and ILR w.r.t. generalized
Veltman semantics. Our proofs are based on the notion of full labels [2]. We also give shorter
proofs of completeness w.r.t. generalized semantics for many classical interpretability logics.
We obtain decidability and finite model property w.r.t. generalized semantics for ILP0 and
ILR. Finally, we develop a construction that might be useful for proofs of completeness of
extensions of ILW w.r.t. generalized semantics in the future, and demonstrate its usage with
ILW* = ILM0W.
Keywords: interpretability logic, Veltman semantics, completeness, filtration, finite model prop-
erty, decidability
1 Introduction
1.1 Interpretability logics
The language of interpretability logics is given by A ::= p | ⊥ |A→ A |AA, where p ranges over
a countable set of propositional variables. Other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations,
as usual. Since A can be defined (over extensions of IL) as an abbreviation too (exapnded to
¬A  ⊥), we do not include  or 3 in the language. If A is constructed in this way, we will say
that A is a modal formula.
Definition 1. Interpretability logic IL is given by the following list of axiom schemata.
1. classical tautologies (in the new language);
K (A→ B)→ (A→ B);
L (A→ A)→ A;
J1 (A→ B)→ AB;
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J2 (AB) ∧ (B  C) → A C;
J3 (A C) ∧ (B  C) → A ∨B  C;
J4 AB → (3A→ 3B);
J5 3AA.
Rules of inference are modus ponens and necessitation (generalization).
We treat  as having higher priority than →, but lower than other logical connectives. Other
interpretability logics are obtained by extending IL with further schemata (“principles of inter-
pretability”).
Let us briefly describe the motivation behind studying interpretability logics. In a sufficiently
strong formal theory T in the language LT , one can construct a binary interpretability predicate
IntT . This predicate expresses that one finite extension of T interprets another finite extension of
T . Any mapping A 7→ A∗ where A is a modal formula and A∗ ∈ LT , such that:
• it commutes with logical connectives;
• if p is a propositional variable, p∗ is a sentence;
• (AB)∗ = IntT (⌈A∗⌉, ⌈B∗⌉), where ⌈X⌉ is the numeral of the Go¨del number of X ;
is called an arithmetical interpretation. The interpretability logic of T , denoted by IL(T), is the
set of all modal formulas A such that T ⊢ A∗ for all arithmetical interpretations. Berarducci [1]
and Shavrukov [9] independently proved that IL(T) = ILM, if T is an essentially reflexive theory.
Visser [10] proved that IL(T) = ILP, if T is finitely axiomatizable and contains supexp.
One of the major open problems in the field is to determine IL(All), the interpretability logic
of all “reasonable arithmetical theories.” The ongoing search for IL(All) is the main motivation
behind studying extensions of IL. Studying modal properties of lower bounds of IL(All) turns out
to be useful for finding new principles within IL(All). For example, the principle R was discovered
while trying to prove modal completeness of ILP0W [6].
Definitions and furher details can be found in e.g. [11].
1.2 Semantics
The most commonly used semantics for the interpretability logic IL and its extensions is the Veltman
semantics (or ordinary Veltman semantics).
Definition 2 ([3], Definition 1.2). A Veltman frame F is a structure (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}), where
W is a non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded binary relation on W and for all
w ∈W we have:
a) Sw ⊆ R[w]2, where R[w] = {x ∈W : wRx};
b) Sw is reflexive on R[w];
c) Sw is transitive;
d) if wRuRv then uSwv.
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A Veltman model is a quadrupleM = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},), where the first three components
form a generalized Veltman frame. The forcing relation  is extended as usual in Boolean cases,
and w  A  B holds if and only if for all u such that wRu and u  A there exists v such that
uSwv and v  B.
In what follows we will mainly use the following semantics, which we will refer to as the gen-
eralized Veltman semantics. De Jongh defined this specific generalization of Veltman semantics.
The main purpose of its introduction, and until recently the only usage, was to show independence
of certain extensions of IL, by Verbrugge (private correspondence), Vukovic´ [13] and Goris and
Joosten [6].
Definition 3. A generalized Veltman frame F is a structure (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}), where W is a
non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded binary relation on W and for all w ∈W
we have:
a) Sw ⊆ R[w]× (P(R[w]) \ {∅});
b) Sw is quasi-reflexive: wRu implies uSw{u};
c) Sw is quasi-transitive: if uSwV and vSwZv for all v ∈ V , then uSw(
⋃
v∈V Zv);
d) if wRuRv, then uSw{v};
e) monotonicity: if uSwV and V ⊆ Z ⊆ R[w], then uSwZ.
A generalized Veltman model is a quadruple M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},), where the first three
components form a Veltman frame. Now w  A  B holds if and only if for all u such that wRu
and u  A there exists V such that uSwV and V  B. We write V  B if v  B for all v ∈ V .
1.3 Principles, completeness and decidability
Let us review some relevant results and approaches. When we need to refer to an extension of IL
(an arbitrary extension if not stated otherwise), we will write ILX.
Let (X) (resp. (X)gen) denote a formula of first-order or higher-order logic such that for all
ordinary (resp. generalized) Veltman frames F the following holds:
F  X if and only if F |= (X) (resp. F |= (X)gen).
Formulas (X) and (X)gen are called characteristic properties (or frame conditions) of the given logic
ILX. The class of all ordinary (resp. generalized) Veltman frames F such that F |= (X) (resp. F |=
(X)gen) is called the chararacteristic class of (resp. generalized) frames for ILX. If F |= (X)gen we also
say that the frame F possesses the property (X)gen. We say that an ordinary (resp. generalized)
Veltman model M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) is an ILX-model (resp. ILgenX-model), or that
model M possesses the property (X) (resp. (X)gen), if the frame (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}) possesses the
property (X) (resp. (X)gen). A logic ILX will be said to be complete with respect to ordinary (resp.
generalized) semantics if for all modal formulas A we have that validity of A over all ILX-frames
(resp. all ILgenX-frames) implies ILX ⊢ A.
We say that ILX has finite model property (FMP) w.r.t. ordinary (resp. generalized) semantics
if for each formula A satisfiable in some ILX-model (resp. ILgenX-model), A is also satisfiable in
some finite ILX-model (resp. ILgenX-model).
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If we include results from the current paper, we have the following table. Here, o stands for the
ordinary Veltman semantics, and g for the generalized Veltman semantics (as defined earlier).1
principle compl. (o) compl. (g) FMP (o) FMP (g)
M AB → A ∧C B ∧C + + + +
M0 AB → 3A ∧C B ∧C + + ? +
P AB → (AB) + + + +
P0 A3B → (AB) - + / +
R A B → ¬(A ¬C) B ∧C ? + ? +
W AB → AB ∧¬A + + + +
W∗ AB → B ∧C B ∧C ∧¬A + + ? +
De Jongh and Veltman proved the completeness of the logics IL, ILM and ILP w.r.t. their
characteristic classes of ordinary (and finite) Veltman frames in [3]. As is usual for extension of
the provability logic GL, all completeness proofs suffer from compactness-related issues. One way
to go about this is to define a (large enough) adequate set of formulas and let worlds be maximal
consistent subsets of such sets (used e.g. in [3]). With interpretability logics and ordinary semantics,
worlds have not been identified (just) with sets of formulas, because of issues described in e.g. [3].
In [4], de Jongh and Veltman proved completeness of the logic ILW w.r.t. its characteristic class of
ordinary (and finite) Veltman frames.
Goris and Joosten introduced a more robust approach to proving completeness of interpretability
logics, the construction method [5], [6]. In this type of proofs, one builds models step by step, and
the final model is retrieved as a union. While closer to intuitions and more informative than the
standard proofs, these proofs are hard to produce and verify due to their size. (They might have
been shorter if tools from [2] have been used from the start.) For the purpose for which they were
invented (completeness of ILM0 and ILW* w.r.t. ordinary semantics) they are still the only known
tools.
The completeness of interpretability logics w.r.t. generalized semantics is usually an easy conse-
quence of the completeness w.r.t. ordinary semantics. In [8] and [7], filtration technique was used
to prove the finite model property of IL and its extensions ILM, ILM0 and ILW
∗ w.r.t. generalized
Veltman semantics. Generalized semantics was used because issues occurred when merging worlds
of ordinary Veltman models. Those explorations yielded some decidability results.
The aim of this paper is to show completeness (w.r.t. generalized semantics) and decidability
of some interpretability logics. We introduce a very direct type of proof for proving completeness;
similar to [3] in their general approach. We use smart labels from [2] for this purpose. An example
that illustrates benefits of using generalized semantics will be given in the section dedicated to
ILM0.
The main new results of this paper are completeness and finite model property (and thus de-
cidability) of ILR and ILP0. The principle R is important because it forms the basis of the, at the
moment, strongest candidate for IL(All). Results concerning the principle ILP0 are interesting in a
1If we adhere to our definitions, ILP0 has FMP w.r.t. ordinary semantics, but this is not a useful result since it
is incomplete w.r.t. ordinary semantics.
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different way; they answer an old question: is there an unravelling technique that transforms gen-
eralized ILX-models to ordinary ILX-models, that preserves satisfaction of relevant characteristic
properties? The answer is no: we find ILP0 to be complete w.r.t. generalized semantics, but it is
known to be incomplete w.r.t. ordinary semantics.
Other results include reproving some known facts with (much) shorter proofs. Of particular
interest is the logic ILW, which was known to be complete and decidable, but for which we never-
theless reprove completeness w.r.t. gerenalized semantics using our approach. We will explain our
motivation for doing so in the section dedicated to ILW.
2 Completeness w.r.t. generalized semantics
In what follows, “formula” will always mean “modal formula”. If the ambient logic in some context
is ILX, a maximal consistent set w.r.t. ILX will be called an ILX-MCS. Let us now introduce smart
labels from [2].
Definition 4 ([2], slightly modified Definition 3.1). Let w, u and x be some ILX-MCS’s, and let
S and T be arbitrary sets of formulas. We define w ≺S u if for any finite S′ ⊆ S and any formula
A we have that A
∨
G∈S′ ¬G ∈ w implies ¬A,¬A ∈ u.
Note that the small differences between our Definition 4 and Definition 3.1 [2] do not affect
results of [2] that we use.
Definition 5 ([2], page 4). Let u be an ILX-MCS, and S an arbitrary set of formulas. Put:
uS = {¬A : S
′ ⊆ S, S′ finite, A
∨
G∈S′
¬G ∈ u};
u⊡S = {¬A,¬A : S
′ ⊆ S, S′ finite, A
∨
G∈S′
¬G ∈ u}.
Thus, w ≺S u if and only if w⊡S ⊆ u. If S = ∅ then u

∅ = {¬A : A  ⊥ ∈ u}. Since u is
maximal consistent, usages of this set usually amount to the same as of {A : A ∈ u}.
We will usually write w ≺ u instead of w ≺∅ u.
Lemma 6 ([2], Lemma 3.2). Let w, u and v be some ILX-MCS’s, and let S and T be some sets of
formulas. Then we have:
a) if S ⊆ T and w ≺T u, then w ≺S u;
b) if w ≺S u ≺ v, then w ≺S v;
c) if w ≺S u, then S ⊆ u.
We will tacitly use properties of the preceding lemma in most of our proofs.
The following two lemmas can be used to construct (or in our case, find) a MCS with the
required properties.
Lemma 7 ([2], Lemma 3.4). Let w be an ILX-MCS, and let ¬(B  C) ∈ w. Then there is an
ILX-MCS u such that w ≺{¬C} u and B,¬B ∈ u.
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Lemma 8 ([2], Lemma 3.5). Let w and u be some ILX-MCS’s such that B  C ∈ w, w ≺S u and
B ∈ u. Then there is an ILX-MCS v such that w ≺S v and C,¬C ∈ v.
Let B be a formula, and w a world in a generalized Veltman model. Put [B]w = {u : wRu and
u  B}.
In the remainder of the current paper, we will assume that D is always a finite set of formulas,
closed under taking subformulas and single negations, and ⊤ ∈ D. The following definition is
central to most of the results of this paper.
Definition 9. Let X be a subset of {M, M0, P, P0, R}. We say that M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},)
is the ILX-structure for a set of formulas D if:
W = {w : w is an ILX-MCS and for some G ∈ D, G ∧¬G ∈ w};
wRu⇔ w ≺ u;
uSwV ⇔ wRu, V ⊆ R[w], (∀S)(w ≺S u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )w ≺S v);
w  p⇔ p ∈ w.
Lemma 10. If ILX 0 ¬A then there is an ILX-MCS w such that A ∧¬A ∈ w.
Proof. We are to show that {A ∧¬A} is an ILX-consistent set. Suppose A,¬A ⊢ ⊥. It follows
that ⊢ ¬A→ ¬A. Applying generalization (necessitation) gives ⊢ (¬A→ ¬A). The Lo¨b axiom
implies ⊢ ¬A. Now, ⊢ ¬A and A,¬A ⊢ ⊥ imply A ⊢ ⊥, i.e. ⊢ ¬A, a contradiction.
Lemma 11. Let X be a subset of {M, M0, P, P0, R}. The ILX-structure M for a set formula D is
a generalized Veltman model. Furthermore, the following holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w,
for all G ∈ D and w ∈ W.
Proof. Let us verify that the ILX-structure M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) for D is a generalized
Veltman model. Since ILX 0 ⊥ and ⊤ ∈ D, Lemma 10 implies W 6= ∅ .
Transitivity of R is immediate. To see converse well-foundedness, assume there are more than
|D| worlds in an R-chain. Then there are x and y with xRy and for some G ∈ D, G,¬G ∈ x, y.
However, ¬G ∈ x and G ∈ y obviously contradict the assumption that xRy (x ≺ y).
Next, let us prove properties of Sw for w ∈ W . Clearly Sw ⊆ R[w] × P(R[w]). If xSwV ,
then w ≺∅ x implies there is at least one element v in V (with w ≺∅ v). Quasi-reflexivity and
monotonicity are obvious. Next, assume wRxRu and w ≺S x. Lemma 6 and w ≺S x ≺ u imply
w ≺S u. Thus xSw{u}. It remains to prove quasi-transitivity. Assume xSwV and vSwUv for all
v ∈ V . Put U =
⋃
v Uv. We claim that xSwU . We have U ⊆ R[w]. Assume w ≺S x. This and
xSwV imply there is v ∈ V such that w ≺S v. This and vSwUv imply there is u ∈ Uv (thus also
u ∈ U) such that w ≺S u.
Let us prove the truth lemma with respect to formulas contained in D. The claim is proved by
induction on the complexity of G ∈ D. We will only consider the case G = B  C.
Assume B  C ∈ w, wRu and u  B. Induction hypothesis implies B ∈ u. We claim that
uSw[C]w. Clearly [C]w ⊆ R[w]. Assume w ≺S u. Lemma 8 implies there is an ILX-MCS v with
w ≺S v and C,¬C ∈ v (thus also wRv and v ∈ W ). Induction hypothesis implies M, v  C.
6
To prove the converse, assume B  C /∈ w. Lemma 7 implies there is u with w ≺{¬C} u and
B,¬B ∈ u (thus u ∈ W ). It is immediate that wRu and the induction hypothesis implies that
u  B. Assume uSwV. We are to show that V 1 C. Since w ≺{¬C} u and uSwV , there is v ∈ V
such that w ≺{¬C} v. Lemma 6 implies ¬C ∈ v. The induction hypothesis implies v 1 C; thus
V 1 C.
Theorem 12. Let X ⊆ {M, M0, P, P0, R}. Assume that for every set D the ILX-structure for D
possesses the property (X)gen. Then ILX is complete w.r.t. ILgenX-models.
Proof. Let A be a formula such that 0 ¬A. Lemma 10 implies there is an ILX-MCS w such that
A ∧¬A ∈ w. Let D have the usual properties, and contain A. Let M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},)
be the ILX-structure for D. Since A ∧ ¬A ∈ w and A ∈ D, we have w ∈ W . Lemma 11 implies
M, w 1 ¬A.
Corollary 13. The logic IL is complete w.r.t. generalized Veltman models.
Note that the method presented in [14] now implies completeness of IL w.r.t. ordinary Veltman
models. Unfortunately, this method does not preserve characteristic properties in general.
In the following sections we prove (or reprove) the completeness of the following logics w.r.t.
generalized semantics: ILM, ILM0, ILP, ILP0, ILR, ILW and ILW*.
2.1 The logic ILM
Completeness of the logic ILM w.r.t. generalized semantics is an easy consqeuence of the complete-
ness of ILM w.r.t. ordinary semantics, first proved by de Jongh and Veltman [3]. Another proof of
the same result was given by Goris and Joosten, using the construction method in [6].
Verbrugge determined the characteristic property (M)gen in 1992. in an unpublished paper:
uSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V )(uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]).
Lemma 14 ([2], Lemma 3.7). Let w and u be some ILM-MCS’s, and let S be a set of formulas.
If w ≺S u then w ≺S∪u
∅
u.
Theorem 15. The logic ILM is complete w.r.t. ILgenM-models.
Proof. Given Theorem 12, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILM-structure for D possesses
the property (M)gen. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},) be the ILM-structure for D.
Let uSwV and take V
′ = {v ∈ V : w ≺u
∅
v}. We claim uSwV ′ and R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]. Suppose
w ≺S u. Lemma 14 implies w ≺S∪u
∅
u. Since uSwV , we have that there is v ∈ V with w ≺S∪u
∅
v.
So, v ∈ V ′. Thus, uSwV ′.
Now let v ∈ V ′ and z ∈ W be such that vRz. Since v ∈ V ′, w ≺u
∅
v. Then for all B ∈ u we
have B ∈ v. Since vRz, we have B,B ∈ z. So, u ≺ z i.e. uRz.
2.2 The logic ILM0
Modal completeness of ILM0 w.r.t. Veltman semantics was proved in [5] by E. Goris and J. J.
Joosten. Certain difficulties encountered in this proof were our main motivation for using general-
ized Veltman semantics. We will sketch these difficulties and show in what way does generalized
semantics overcome them.
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Characteristic property (M0)gen (see [7]):
wRuRxSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V )(uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ⊆ R[u])).
Lemma 16 ([2], Lemma 3.9). Let w, u and x be ILM0-MCS’s, and S an arbitrary set of formulas.
If w ≺S u ≺ x then w ≺S∪u
∅
x.
To motivate our proving of completeness (of ILM0, but also in general) w.r.t. generalized se-
mantics, let us sketch a situation for which there are clear benefits in working with generalized
semantics. We do this only now because ILM0 is sufficiently complex to display (some of) these
benefits. Suppose we are building models step by step (as in the construction method [5]), and
worlds w, u1, u2 and x occur in the configuration displayed in Figure 1. Furthermore, suppose we
need to produce an Sw-successor v of x.
 
w
u1
u2
B1
B2
B1
B2
B1, B2 B1
B2x w
u1
u2
xv
V
V2
V1
Figure 1: Left: extending an ordinary Veltman model. Right: extending a generalized Veltman
model. Straight lines represent R-transitions, while curved lines represent Sw-transitions. Full lines
represent the starting configuration, and dashed lines represent transitions that are to be added.
With ordinary semantics, we need to ensure that for our Sw-successor v, for each B1 ∈ u1
and B2 ∈ u2, we have B1,B2 ∈ v. It is not obvious that such construction is possible.
In case of ILM0, it was successfully solved in [5] by preserving the invariant that sets of boxed
formulas in ui are linearly ordered. This way, finite (quasi-)models can always be extended by only
looking at the last ui. With generalized semantics, we need to produce a whole set of worlds V ,
but the requirements on each particular world are less demanding. For each ui, there has to be a
corresponding Vi ⊆ V with Bi contained (true) in every world of Vi. Lemma 16 gives a recipe for
producing such worlds.
Theorem 17. The logic ILM0 is complete w.r.t. ILgenM0-models.
Proof. Given Theorem 12, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILM0-structure for D possesses
the property (M0)gen. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},) be the ILM0-structure for D.
Assume wRuRxSwV and take V
′ = {v ∈ V : w ≺u
∅
v}. We claim that uSwV ′ and R[V ′] ⊆
R[u]. Obviously V ′ ⊆ V ⊆ R[w]. Assume w ≺S u. Lemma 16 and w ≺S u ≺ x imply w ≺S∪u
∅
x.
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Now xSwV and the definition of Sw imply there is v ∈ V such that w ≺S∪u
∅
v. Lemma 6 implies
w ≺u
∅
v. So, v ∈ V ′.
It remains to verify that R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]. Let v ∈ V ′ and z ∈ W be worlds such that vRz. Since
w ≺u
∅
v, for all B ∈ u we have B ∈ v, and since vRz, it follows that B,B ∈ z. Thus, u ≺ z
i.e. uRz.
2.3 The logic ILP
As in the case of the logic ILM, the completeness of ILP w.r.t. generalized semantics is an easy
consqeuence of the completeness of ILP w.r.t. ordinary semantics, first proved by de Jongh and
Veltman [3].
Verbrugge determined the characteristic property (P)gen in 1992. in an unpublished paper:
wRw′RuSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V ) uSw′V
′
Lemma 18 ([2] Lemma 3.8). Let w, x and u be some ILP-MCS’s, and let S and T be arbitrary
sets of formulas. If w ≺S x ≺T u then w ≺S∪x⊡
T
u.
Theorem 19. The logic ILP is complete w.r.t. ILgenP-models.
Proof. Given Theorem 12, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILP-structure for D possesses
the property (P)gen. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) be the ILP-structure for D.
Let wRw′RuSwV and take V
′ = V ∩ R[w′]. We claim uSw′V ′. Let T be arbitrary such that
w′ ≺T u. Lemma 18 and w ≺∅ w
′ ≺T u imply w ≺w′⊡
T
u. Now, uSwV implies that there is a v ∈ V
with w ≺w′⊡
T
v. Let A  ¬
∧
T ′ ∈ w′ for some finite T ′ ⊆ T . Then ¬A,¬A ∈ w′⊡T . Lemma 6
and w ≺w′⊡
T
v imply ¬A,¬A ∈ v. Thus w′ ≺T v. Finally, V ′ ⊆ R[w′] holds by assumption, thus
uSw′V
′.
2.4 The logic ILP0
The interpretability principle P0 = A  3B → (A  B) is introduced in J. J. Joosten’s master
thesis in 1998.
In [6] it is shown that the interpretability logic ILP0 is incomplete w.r.t. Veltman models.
Since we will show that ILP0 is complete w.r.t. generalized semantics, this is the first example of
an interpretability logic complete w.r.t. the generalized semantics, but incomplete w.r.t. ordinary
semantics.
Characteristic property (P0)gen was determined in [6] . A slightly reformulated version:
wRxRuSwV & (∀v ∈ V )R[v] ∩ Z 6= ∅ ⇒ (∃Z
′ ⊆ Z)uSxZ
′
The following technical lemma is almost obvious.
Lemma 20. Let x be an ILX-MCS, A a formula, and T a finite set of formulas. Let BG be
an arbitrary formula, and TG an arbitrary finite set of formulas, for every G ∈ T . Furthermore,
assume:
a) A
∨
G∈T BG ∈ x;
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b) (∀G ∈ T ) BG 
∨
H∈TG ¬H ∈ x.
Then we have A
∨
H∈S′ ¬H ∈ x, where S
′ =
⋃
G∈T TG.
Proof. Let G ∈ T . Since TG ⊆ S′, clearly ⊢
∨
H∈TG ¬H 
∨
H∈S′ ¬H . The requirement b) and
the axiom (J2) imply BG 
∨
H∈S′ ¬H ∈ x. Now |T | − 1 applications of the axiom (J3) give∨
G∈T BG 
∨
H∈S′ ¬H ∈ x. Finally, apply the requirement a) and the axiom (J2).
Next we need a labelling lemma for ILP0. This is where we use the technical lemma above.
Lemma 21. Let w, x and u be some ILP0-MCS’s, and let S be a set of formulas. If w ≺ x ≺S u
then w ≺x
S
u.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary formula. Let T ⊆ xS be a finite set such that A 
∨
G∈T ¬G ∈ w.
We will prove that ¬A,¬A ∈ u. If G ∈ T (⊆ xS ), then G = ¬BG, for some formula BG. Thus
A 
∨
G∈T ¬¬BG ∈ w, and by easy inferences and maximal consistency: A 
∨
G∈T 3BG ∈ w,
and A  3
∨
G∈T BG ∈ w. Applying P0 gives (A 
∨
G∈T BG) ∈ w. The assumption w ≺ x
implies A 
∨
G∈T BG ∈ x. For each G ∈ T (⊆ x

S ) there is a finite subset TG of S such that
BG 
∨
H∈TG ¬H ∈ x. Let S
′ =
⋃
G∈T TG. Clearly S
′ is a finite subset of S. Lemma 20 implies
A
∨
H∈S′ ¬H ∈ x. Finally, S
′ ⊆ S and the assumption x ≺S u imply ¬A,¬A ∈ u.
The following simple observation is useful both for ILP0 and ILR.
Lemma 22. Let w, x, v and z be some ILX-MCS’s, and let S be a set of formulas. If w ≺x
S
v ≺ z
then x ≺S z.
Proof. Let S′ be a finite subset of S with A
∨
G∈S′ ¬G ∈ x. Then ¬A ∈ x

S . Now w ≺x
S
v and
Lemma 6 imply ¬A ∈ v. Since v ≺ z, we have ¬A,¬A ∈ z.
Theorem 23. The logic ILP0 is complete w.r.t. ILgenP0-frames.
Proof. Given Theorem 12, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILP0-structure for D possesses
the property (P0)gen. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) be the ILP0-structure for D.
Assume wRxRuSwV and R[v]∩Z 6= ∅ for each v ∈ V . We will prove that there is Z
′ ⊆ Z such
that uSxZ
′.
Let S be a set of formulas such that w ≺ x ≺S u. Lemma 21 implies w ≺x
S
u. Since uSwV , there
is v ∈ V such that w ≺x
S
v. Since R[v] ∩Z 6= ∅, choose a world zS ∈ R[v] ∩Z. Now w ≺x
S
v ≺ zS
and Lemma 22 imply x ≺S zS . Put Z ′ = {zS : S is a set of formulas such that x ≺S u}. Clearly
Z ′ ⊆ Z. So, Z ′ ⊆ R[x], and since for each set S such that x ≺S u we have x ≺S zS , it follow that
uSxZ
′.
In [14] a possibility was explored of transforming a generalized Veltman model to an ordinary
Veltman model, such that these two models are bisimilar (in some aptly defined sense). A natural
question is whether such transformation exists if we add the requirement that characteristic prop-
erties are preserved. The example of ILP0 shows that there are ILgenP0-models with no (bisimilar
or otherwise) counterpart ILP0-models.
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2.5 The logic ILR
Completeness of ILR w.r.t. ordinary Veltman semantics is an open problem (see [2]), but complete-
ness w.r.t. the generalized semantics is not yet resolved either. In this section we will prove that
ILR is complete w.r.t. the generalized semantics.
Characteristic property (R)gen was determined in [6]. A slightly reformulated version:
wRxRuSwV ⇒ (∀C ∈ C(x, u))(∃U ⊆ V )(xSwU & R[U ] ⊆ C),
where C(x, u) = {C ⊆ R[x] : (∀Z)(uSxZ ⇒ Z ∩ C 6= ∅)} is the family of “choice sets”.
Lemma 24 ([2], Lemma 3.10). Let w, x and u be some ILR-MCS’s, and let S and T be arbitrary
sets of formulas. If w ≺S x ≺T u then w ≺S∪x
T
u.
Theorem 25. The logic ILR is complete w.r.t. ILgenR-models.
Proof. Given Theorem 12, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILR-structure for D possesses
the property (R)gen. Let (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},) be the ILR-structure for D.
Assume wRxRuSwV and C ∈ C(x, u). We are to show that (∃U ⊆ V )(xSwU & R[U ] ⊆ C). We
will first prove an auxiliary claim:
(∀S)
(
w ≺S x ⇒ (∃v ∈ V )(w ≺S∪x
∅
v & R[v] ⊆ C)
)
.
So, let S be arbitrary such that w ≺S x, and suppose (for a contradiction) that for every v ∈ V with
w ≺S∪x
∅
v, we have R[v] * C, that is, there is some zv ∈ R[v]\C. Let Z = {zv : v ∈ V,w ≺S∪x
∅
v}.
We claim that uSxZ. Let T be arbitrary such that x ≺T u, and we should prove that there exists
z ∈ Z such that x ≺T z. From w ≺S x ≺T u and Lemma 24 it follows that w ≺S∪x
T
u. Since
uSwV , there is v ∈ V with w ≺S∪x
T
v. Now, x∅ ⊆ x

T and Lemma 6 imply w ≺S∪x
∅
v, so there is
a world zv ∈ Z as defined earlier. Furthermore, w ≺x
T
v ≺ zv and Lemma 22 imply x ≺T zv. To
prove uSxZ it remains to verify that Z ⊆ R[x]. Let zv ∈ Z be arbitrary and apply Lemma 6 and
Lemma 22 as before. Now, uSxZ and C ∈ C(x, u) imply C ∩ Z 6= ∅, contradicting the definition of
Z. This concludes the proof of the auxiliary claim.
Let U = {v ∈ V : w ≺x
∅
v and R[v] ⊆ C}. Auxiliary claim implies U 6= ∅. If w ≺S x,
auxiliary claim implies there is v ∈ U such that w ≺S∪x
∅
v and R[v] ⊆ C, so v ∈ U . Thus xSwU .
It is clear that R[U ] ⊆ C.
3 The logics ILW and ILW*
To prove that ILW is complete, one could try to find a sufficiently strong “labelling lemma” and
utilise Definition 9. One candidate might be the following condition:
w ≺S u ⇒ (∃G ∈ D)w ≺S∪{¬G} u and G ∈ u,
where D is finite, closed under subformulas and such that each w ∈W contains Aw and 2¬Aw for
some Aw ∈ D.
Since we weren’t successful in finding a sufficiently strong labelling lemma for ILW, we will
use a modified version of Definition 9 to work with ILW and its extensions. This way we won’t
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require a labelling lemma, but we lose generality in the following sense. To prove the completeness
of ILXW, for some X , it no longer suffices to simply show that the structure defined in Definition
9 has the required characteristic property (when each world is an ILX-MCS). Instead, the charac-
teristic property of ILX has to be shown to hold even on the modified structure. So, to improve
compatibility with proofs based on Definition 9, we should prove the completeness of ILW with as
similar definition to Definition 9 as possible. That is what we do in the remainder of this section.
This approach turns out to be good enough for ILW* (ILM0W). We didn’t succeed in using it
to prove the completeness of ILRW. However, to the best of our knowledge, ILRW might not be
complete at all.
In [6] the (complement of the) characteristic class for ILW is given by the condition Not-W such
that for any generalized Veltman frame F we have that
F |= Not-W if and only if F 1 W.
Another condition is (W)gen from [7]:
uSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V )(uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] = ∅).
We will use (this formulation of) (W)gen in what follows. In the proof of the completeness of logic
ILW we will use the following two lemmas. In what follows, ILWX denotes an arbitrary extension
of ILW.
Lemma 26 ([2], Lemma 3.12). Let w be an ILWX-MCS, and B and C formulas such that ¬(B 
C) ∈ w. Then there is an ILWX-MCS u such that w ≺{¬B,¬C} u and B ∈ u.
Lemma 27 ([2], Lemma 3.13). Let w and u be some ILWX-MCS, B and C some formulas, and
S a set of formulas such that B C ∈ w, w ≺S u and B ∈ u. Then there is an ILWX-MCS v such
that w ≺S∪{¬B} v and C,¬C ∈ v.
Given a binary relation R, let R˙[x] = R[x] ∪ {x}.
Definition 28. Let X beW orW*. We say that M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},) is the ILX-structure
for a set of formulas D if:
W = {w : w is an ILX-MCS and for some G ∈ D, G ∧¬G ∈ w};
wRu⇔ w ≺ u;
uSwV ⇔ wRu, V ⊆ R[w] and one of the following holds:
(a) V ∩ R˙[u] 6= ∅;
(b) (∀S)(w ≺S u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )(∃G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]) w ≺S∪{¬G} v);
w  p⇔ p ∈ w.
Lemma 29. Let X be W or W*. ILX-structure M for D is a generalized Veltman model. Further-
more, the following holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w,
for each G ∈ D and w ∈ W.
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Proof. Let us first verify that the ILX-structureM = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) for D is a generalized
Veltman model. All the properties, except for quasi-transitivity, have easy proofs (see the proof of
Lemma 11).
Let us prove quasi-transitivity. Assume uSwV , and vSwUv for all v ∈ V . Put U =
⋃
v∈V Uv.
We claim that uSwU . Clearly U ⊆ R[w]. To prove uSwU we will distinguish the cases (a) and (b)
from the definition of the relation Sw for uSwV.
In the case (a), we have v0 ∈ V for some v0 ∈ R˙[u]. We will next distinguish two cases from the
definition of v0SwUv0 .
In the case (aa) we have x ∈ Uv0 for some x ∈ R˙[v0]. Since v0 ∈ R˙[u], we then have x ∈ R˙[u].
Since x ∈ Uv0 ⊆ U , then U ∩ R˙[u] 6= ∅. So, we have uSwU , as required.
In the case (ab) we have:
(∀S)(w ≺S v0 ⇒ (∃x ∈ Uv0)(∃G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0]) w ≺S∪{¬G} x).
To prove uSwU in this case, we will use the case (b) from the definiton of the relation Sw. Assume
w ≺S u. Then we have w ≺S u ≺ v0 or w ≺S u = v0. Either way, possibly using Lemma Lemma 6,
we have w ≺S v0, and so there are x ∈ Uv0 and G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0] with w ≺S∪{¬G} x. Since uRv0
or u = v0, we have R˙[v0] ⊆ R˙[u]. So, the claim follows.
In the case (b), we have:
(∀S)(w ≺S u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )(∃G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]) w ≺S∪{¬G} v).
To prove uSwU we will use the case (b) from the definition of the relation Sw. Assume w ≺S u.
Then there are v0 ∈ V and G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u] such that w ≺S∪{¬G} v0. From v0 ∈ V it follows that
v0SwUv0 . We will next distinguish the possible cases in the definition of v0SwUv0 .
In the first case (ba) we have Uv0 ∩ R˙[v0] 6= ∅, i.e. there is x ∈ Uv0 ∩ R˙[v0]. Then w ≺S∪{¬G}
v0 = x or w ≺S∪{¬G} v0 ≺ x. In both cases (possibly using Lemma 6) we have w ≺S∪{¬G} x.
In the case (bb):
(∀S′)(w ≺S′ v0 ⇒ (∃x ∈ Uv0)(∃G
′ ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0]) w ≺S′∪{¬G′} x).
From w ≺S∪{¬G} v0 it follows that there are some x ∈ Uv0 and G
′ ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[v0] such that
w ≺S∪{¬G,¬G′} x. Lemma 6 implies w ≺S∪{¬G} x, as required.
We claim that for each formula G ∈ D and each world w ∈W the following holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w.
The claim is proved by induction on the complexity of G. The only non-trivial case is when
G = B  C.
Assume B  C ∈ w, wRu and u  B. Induction hypothesis implies B ∈ u. We claim that
uSw[C]w. Clearly [C]w ⊆ R[w]. Assume w ≺S u. Lemma 27 implies that there is an ILX-MCS v
with w ≺S∪{¬B} v and C,¬C ∈ v (thus v ∈ W ). Since C ∈ v, the induction hypothesis implies
v  C. Since w ≺ v, i.e. wRv, then v ∈ [C]w . Now, B ∈ D and B ∈ u imply B ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]. Thus
uSw[C]w holds, by the clause (b) from the definition.
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To prove the converse, assume B  C /∈ w. Since w is ILX-MCS, ¬(B  C) ∈ w. Lemma 26
implies there is u with w ≺{¬B,¬C} u and B ∈ u. Lemma 6 implies ¬B ∈ u. So, B ∧¬B ∈ u;
thus u ∈ W. The induction hypothesis implies u  B. Let V ⊆ R[w] be such that uSwV . We
will find a world v ∈ V such that w ≺{¬C} v. We will distinguish the cases (a) and (b) from
the definition of the relation Sw. Consider the case (a). Let v be an arbitrary node in V ∩ R˙[u].
If v = u, clearly w ≺{¬B,¬C} v. If uRv, then we have w ≺{¬B,¬C} u ≺ v. Lemma 6 implies
w ≺{¬B,¬C} v. Consider the case (b). From w ≺{¬B,¬C} u and the definition of Sw it follows
that there is v ∈ V and a formula D ∈ D such that w ≺{¬B,¬C,¬D} v. In both cases we have
w ≺{¬C} v; thus C /∈ v. Induction hypothesis implies v 1 C; whence V 1 C, as required.
Theorem 30. The logic ILW is complete w.r.t. ILgenW-models.
Proof. In the light of Lemma 29, it suffices to show that the ILW-structure M for D possesses the
property (W)gen. Recall the characteristic property (W)gen:
uSwV ⇒ (∃V
′ ⊆ V )(uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] = ∅).
Suppose for a contradiction that there are w, u and V such that:
uSwV & (∀V
′ ⊆ V )(uSwV
′ ⇒ R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] 6= ∅). (1)
Let V denote all such sets V (for arbitrary but fixed w and u).
Let n = 2|D|. Fix any enumeration D0, . . . ,Dn−1 of P(D) that satisfies D0 = ∅. Denote a new
relation Siw for all 0 ≤ i < n, y ∈ W and U ⊆W as follows:
ySiwU ⇐⇒ ySwU, Di ⊆
⋃
R˙[y], U ⊆
[ ∨
G∈Di
¬G
]
w
.
Let y ∈W and U ⊆W be arbitrary. Let us prove that ySwU implies the following:
(∃U ′ ⊆ U)(∃i < n) ySiwU
′. (2)
If ySwU holds by (a) from the definition of Sw, the set U ∩ R˙[y] is non-empty. Pick arbitrary
z ∈ U ∩ R˙[y] and put U ′ = {z}. We have either wRyRz or y = z. If wRyRz, we have ySw{z}.
Otherwise y = z. Now quasi-reflexivity implies ySw{z}. Since y ∈ W , there is a formula G ∈ D
such that G ∧ ¬G ∈ y. Fix i < n such that Di = {G}. Clearly Di ⊆
⋃
R˙[y]. Since z ∈ U and
ySwU , clearly U
′ ⊆ R[w]. Since yRz, we also have ¬G ∈ z. Truth lemma implies U ′  ¬G;
since if zRt, G /∈ t, (truth lemma is applied here) t 1 G, so z  ¬G. Thus U ′ ⊆ [¬G]w, and
ySiwU
′.
If ySwU holds by (b) from the definition of Sw, take:
U ′ = {z ∈ U : (∃G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[y]) w ≺{¬G} z};
Di = {G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[y] : (∃z ∈ U) w ≺{¬G} z}.
In other words, U ′ is the image of the mapping that is implicitly present in the definition of the
relation Sw (clause (b)): for each S, pick a world vS (to be included in U
′), and a formula GS (to
be included in Di).
Let m < n be maximal such that there are U ∈ V and U ′ ⊆ U with the following properties:
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(i) (∀x ∈ U)[(∃y ∈ R[x])(∃Z ⊆ U)(∃i ≤ m) ySiwZ ⇒ x /∈ U
′];
(ii) (∀x ∈ W )(xSwU ⇒ xSwU ′).
Since D0 = ∅, we have [
∨
G∈D0 ¬G]w = [⊥]w = ∅. So there are no Z ⊆ [
∨
G∈D0 ¬G]w such
that ySwZ for some y ∈ W . So, if we take m = 0 and U ′ = U for any U ∈ V , (i) and (ii) are
trivially satisfied.
Since n is finite and conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied for at least one value m, there must be
a maximal m < n with the required properties.
Let us first prove that m < n − 1. Assume the opposite, that is, m = n − 1. Then there
are U ∈ V and U ′ ⊆ U such that the conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied for m = n − 1. Since
U ∈ V , we have uSwU. The condition (ii) implies uSwU ′. Now U ∈ V , U ′ ⊆ U and uSwU ′ imply
R[U ′]∩ S−1w [U ] 6= ∅. Thus there are x ∈ U
′ and y ∈ R[x] such that ySwU . Now (ii) implies ySwU
′.
The earlier remark (2) implies that there is Z ⊆ U ′ and i < n such that ySiwZ. Since m = n− 1, it
follows that i ≤ m. The condition (i) implies x 6∈ U ′, a contradiction. Thus m < n− 1.
Let us now prove that m is not maximal, by showing that m+1 satisfies (i) and (ii). Let U ∈ V
and U ′ ⊆ U be some sets such that the conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied for m. Denote:
Y = {x ∈ U ′ : (∃y ∈ R[x])(∃Z ⊆ U ′) ySm+1w Z}.
Let us prove that m + 1 also satisfies (i) and (ii) with U ′ instead of U , and U ′ \ Y instead of U ′.
We should first show that U ′ ∈ V . So, suppose that uSwT ⊆ U
′. Now, T ⊆ U ′ ⊆ U and U ∈ V
imply that there are some v ∈ T and z ∈ R[v] such that zSwU . The property (ii) for m (with sets
U and U ′) implies zSwU
′. So, R[T ] ∩ S−1w [U
′] 6= ∅, as required.
Now let us verify the property (i) for the newly defined sets. Let x ∈ U ′, y ∈ R[x], Z ⊆ U ′, i ≤
m+1 be arbitrary such that ySiwZ. If i ≤ m, the property (i) for m implies x /∈ U
′, so in particular,
x /∈ U ′ \ Y . If i = m+ 1, then x ∈ Y . Thus x /∈ U ′ \ Y and the conditon (i) is satisfied.
It remains to prove (ii). Take arbitrary x ∈ W such that xSwU ′. For every y ∈ Y , the
definition of Y implies existence of some zy ∈ R[y] and Uy ⊆ U ′ such that zySm+1w Uy. From the
definiton of the relation Sm+1w we have Dm+1 ⊆
⋃
R˙[zy]. Now, yRzy and the truth lemma imply
y  3G, for each G ∈ Dm+1. From the definiton of the relation Sm+1w and zyS
m+1
w Uy we have
Uy ⊆ [
∨
G∈Dm+1 ¬G]w. So, the following holds:
Y 
∧
G∈Dm+1
3G and Uy 
∨
G∈Dm+1
¬G,
for all y ∈ Y . Thus, Uy ∩ Y = ∅, for every y ∈ Y. For every y ∈ U ′ \ Y put Uy = {y}. Again,
Uy ∩ Y = ∅. Note that
⋃
y∈U ′ Uy = U
′ \ Y . Now xSwU ′ and quasi-transitivity imply xSwU ′ \ Y .
The fact that (i) and (ii) hold for m+ 1 contradicts the maximality of m.
Goris and Joosten proved in [5] the completeness of ILW* (ILWM0) w.r.t. ordinary Veltman
semantics.
Theorem 31. The logic ILW* is complete w.r.t. ILgenW*-models.
15
Proof. With Lemma 29, it suffices to prove the ILW*-structure for D possesses the properties
(W)gen and (M0)gen, for each appropriate D. So, let M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) be the ILW*-
structure for D. Theorem 30 shows that the model M possesses the property (W)gen. It remains
to show that it posesses the property (M0)gen.
Assume wRuRxSwV . We claim that there is V
′ ⊆ V such that uSwV ′ and R[V ′] ⊆ R[u].
First, consider the case when xSwV holds by the clause (a) from the definition of Sw. So
there is v ∈ V such that x = v or xRv. In both cases, wRuRv, and so uSw{v}. It is clear that
R[v] ⊆ R[x] ⊆ R[u]. So it suffices to take V ′ = {v}.
Otherwise, xSwV holds by the clause (b). Take V
′ = {v ∈ V : w ≺u
∅
v}. Clearly, V ′ ⊆ V ⊆
R[w]. Assume w ≺S u. Now w ≺S u ≺ x and Lemma 16 imply w ≺S∪u
∅
x. The definition of
xSwV (clause (b)) implies there is G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[x] (so G ∈ D ∩
⋃
R˙[u]) and v ∈ V such that
w ≺S∪u
∅
∪{¬G} v, thus also v ∈ V
′. In particular, w ≺S∪{¬G} v. Since S was arbitrary, uSwV
′.
It remains to verify that R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]. Assume V ′ ∋ vRz. Since w ≺u
∅
v, for all B ∈ u we have
B ∈ v, and since vRz, it follows that B,B ∈ z. Thus, u ≺ z i.e. uRz.
In [7] it is shown that ILW* possesses finite model property w.r.t. generalized Veltman models.
To show decidability, (stronger) completeness w.r.t. ordinary Veltman models was used, but the
Theorem 31 would suffice for this purpose.
4 Finite model property and decidability
For IL, ILM, ILP and ILW, original completeness proofs were proofs of completeness w.r.t. ap-
propriate finite models [3], [4]. For these logics, FMP w.r.t. ordinary semantics and decidability
are immediate (and completeness and FMP w.r.t. generalized semantics are easily shown to follow
from these results). These completeness proofs use truncated maximal consistent sets, that is, sets
that are maximal consistent with respect to the so-called adequate set. The principal requirement
is that this set is finite. Already with ILM, defining adequacy is not trivial (see [3]).
For more complex logics, not much is known about FMP w.r.t. ordinary semantics. The filtration
method can be used with generalized models to obtain finite models. This approach was successfully
used to prove FMP of ILM0 and ILW* w.r.t. generalized semantics [8], [7]. A drawback of this
approach is in that FMP w.r.t. ordinary semantics does not follow from FMP w.r.t. generalized
semantics. Decidability can be obtained from FMP w.r.t. either semantics. At the moment it
is not clear whether the choice of semantics would affect our ability to produce results regarding
computational complexity of provability and consistency of ILX.
Let us overview basic notions and results of [8] and [7]. Let A be a formula. If A equals ¬B for
some B, then ∼A is B, otherwise ∼A is ¬B. We need to slightly extend the definition of adequate
sets2 that was used in [8]. The modified version will satisfy all the old properties.
Definition 32. Let D have the usual the properties: a finite set of formulas that is closed under
taking subformulas and single negations, and ⊤ ∈ D. We say that a set of formulas ΓD is an
adequate set w.r.t. D if it satisfies the following conditions:
2Note that this is a different notion of adequacy than the one used for completeness proofs in [3], [4], and [5].
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1. ΓD is closed under taking subformulas;
2. if A ∈ ΓD then ∼A ∈ ΓD;
3. ⊥⊥ ∈ ΓD;
4. AB ∈ ΓD if A is an antecedent or succedent of some -formula in ΓD, and so is B;
5. if A ∈ D then ¬A ∈ ΓD.
Since D is finite, ΓD is finite too. Next we require the concept of bisimulations between gener-
alized models.
Definition 33 ([12]). A bisimulation between generalized Veltman models M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W},) and M′ = (W ′, R′, {S′w′ : w
′ ∈W ′},) is a non-empty relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that:
(at) if wZw′, then w  p if and only if w′  p, for all propositional variables p;
(forth) if wZw′ and wRu, then there is u′ ∈ W ′ such that w′R′u′, uZu′ and for all V ′ ⊆ W ′ such
that u′S′w′V
′ there is V ⊆W such that uSwV and for all v ∈ V there is v′ ∈ V ′ with vZv′;
(back) if wZw′ and w′R′u′, then there is u ∈ W such that wRu, uZu′ and for all V ⊆W such that
uSwV there is V
′ ⊆W ′ such that u′S′w′V
′ and for all v′ ∈ V ′ there is v ∈ V with vZv′.
Given a generalized Veltman model M, the union of all bisimulations on M, denoted by ∼M, is
the largest bisimulation on M, and ∼M is an equivalence relation [12].
An ∼M-equivalence class of w ∈ W will be denoted by [w]. For any set of worlds V , put
‹V = {[w] : w ∈ V }.
A filtration of M through ΓD, ∼M is any generalized Veltman model M˜ = (W˜ , R˜, {S˜[w] : w ∈
W},) such that for all w ∈W and A ∈ ΓD we have w  A if and only if [w]  A (we denote both
forcing relations as , as there is no risk of confusion).
The following lemma combines key results of [8] (Lemma 2.3, Theorem 2.4., Theorem 3.2).
Lemma 34. Let M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) be a generalized Veltman model, and ∼M the
largest bisimulation on M. Define:
(1) [w]R˜[u] if and only if for some w′ ∈ [w] and u′ ∈ [u], w′Ru′ and there is A ∈ ΓD such that
w′ 1 A and u′  A;
(2) [u]S˜[w]‹V if and only if [w]R˜[u], ‹V ⊆ R˜[[w]], and for all w
′ ∈ [w] and u′ ∈ [u] such that w′Ru′
we have u′Sw′V
′ for some V ′ such that V˜ ′ ⊆ ‹V ;
(3) for all propositional variables p ∈ ΓD put [w]  p if and only if w  p, and interpret
propositional variables q 6∈ ΓD arbitrarily (e.g. put [w] 1 q for all [w] ∈ W˜ ).
Then M˜ = (W˜ , R˜, {S˜[w] : w ∈ W},) is a filtration of M through ΓD,∼M. The model M˜ is
finite.
Lemma 34 implies that IL has FMP w.r.t. generalized semantics. To prove that a specific
extension has FMP, it remains to show that filtration preserves its characteristic property.
Since we are going to use ILX-structures as the starting models M, we can make use of their
properties. In particular, we do not have to make sure that there is a formula A such that x 1 A
and y  A when we want to show that xRy implies [x]R˜[y].
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Lemma 35. Let X be a subset of {M, M0, P, P0, R, W} and M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) the
ILX-structure for a set D. If xRy then [x]R˜[y].
Proof. We should find a formula A ∈ ΓD such that x 1 A and y  A. Since y ∈ W , there is
a formula B ∈ D such that B ∧ ¬B ∈ y. Lemma 11 implies y  B ∧ ¬B (¬B might not be
in D, but ∼B is; since R[y]  ∼B, we must have y  ¬B). Since xRy, we have x 1 ¬B. Since
B ∈ D, we have ¬B ∈ ΓD. Thus we can take A = ¬B.
Note that the proof above applies not only when transforming ILX structures M to M˜, but also
when transforming M˜ to M˜.
Lemma 36. Let M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈W},) be the ILP0-structure for D and ∼M be the largest
bisimulation on M. Then the filtration M˜ as defined in Lemma 34 possesses the property (P0)gen.
Proof. Assume [w]R˜[x]R˜[u]S˜[w]V and R˜[[v]] ∩ Z 6= ∅ for each [v] ∈ V. We claim that there exists
Z ′ ⊆ Z such that [u]S˜[x]Z
′.
Since [w]R˜[x], there are w0 ∈ [w] and x0 ∈ [x] such that w0Rx0. Let x
′ ∈ [x] and u′ ∈ [u] be
any worlds such that x′Ru′. The condition (back) implies that there is a world ux′,u′ such that
x0Rux′,u′ and ux′,u′ ∼M u′. Now, [u]S˜[w]V , ux′,u′ ∈ [u] and w0Rux′,u′ imply there is a set Vx′,u′
such that ux′,u′Sw0Vx′,u′ andflVx′,u′ ⊆ V. Since R˜[[v]]∩Z 6= ∅ for each [v] ∈ V , we have R˜[[v]]∩Z 6= ∅
for each v ∈ Vx′,u′ . For each v ∈ Vx′,u′ , choose a world zv such that [zv] ∈ R˜[[v]] ∩ Z. Now [v]R˜[zv]
implies that there are some v′ ∈ [v] and z′v ∈ [zv] such that v
′Rz′v. Applying (back), we can find
a world z′′v such that vRz
′′
v and z
′
v ∼M z
′′
v . Put Zx′,u′ = {z
′′
v : v ∈ Vx′,u′}. Note that we have
R[v] ∩ Zx′,u′ 6= ∅ for each v ∈ Vx′,u′ .
Applying (P0)gen gives ux′,u′Sx0Z
′
x′,u′ for some Z
′
x′,u′ ⊆ Zx′,u′ . Clearly
flZ ′x′,u′ ⊆
flZx′,u′ ⊆ Z.
Continuing our first application of (back), there is a set Z ′′x′,u′ such that u
′Sx′Z
′′
x′,u′ , and for each
z′′ ∈ Z ′′x′,u′ there is z
′ ∈ Z ′x′,u′ such that z
′ ∼M z′′. This implies flZ ′′x′,u′ ⊆
flZ ′x′,u′ . Let T =⋃
x′∈[x],u′∈[u],x′Ru′ Z
′′
x′,u′ and Z
′ = T˜ . It is easy to see that Z ′ ⊆ Z. Lemma 35 implies Z ′ ⊆ R˜[[x]].
We have u′Sx′Z
′′
x′,u′ with
flZ ′′x′,u′ ⊆ Z
′ for all x′ ∈ [x] and u′ ∈ [u] with x′Ru′. Thus, [u]S˜[x]Z
′.
Corollary 37. ILP0 is decidable.
Let us prove the same for ILR.
Lemma 38. Let M = (W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W},) be the ILR-structure for D and ∼M be the largest
bisimulation on M. Then the filtration M˜ as defined in Lemma 34 possesses the property (R)gen.
Proof. Assume [w]R˜[x]R˜[u]S˜[w]V , and let C ∈ C([x], [u]) be an arbitrary choice set. We are to prove
that there is a set U such that ‹U ⊆ V, [x]S˜[w]‹U and R˜[‹U ] ⊆ C.
Put Cx′ = {c ∈ R[x′] : [c] ∈ C} for all x′ ∈ [x].
Let us first prove that for some x0 ∈ [x], u0 ∈ [u] with x0Ru0 we have Cx0 ∈ C(x0, u0). Suppose
not. Then for all x′ ∈ [x], u′ ∈ [u] with x′Ru′, there is a set Zx′,u′ such that u
′Sx′Zx′,u′ with
Zx′,u′ ∩ Cx′ = ∅. Put Z =
⋃
x′∈[x],u′∈[u],x′Ru′ Zx′,u′ . Lemma 35 implies Z˜ ⊆ R˜[[x]]. Thus [u]S˜[x]Z˜.
Since C ∈ C([x], [u]), there is z ∈ Z such that [z] ∈ C ∩ Z˜. Thus z ∈ Zx′,u′ for some x′ ∈ [x], u′ ∈ [u]
and x′Ru′. The definition of Cx′ implies z ∈ Cx′ . Thus, Zx′,u′ ∩ Cx′ 6= ∅, a contradiction.
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Now we claim that for all y ∈ [x] there is uy ∼ u0 with yRuy and Cy ∈ C(y, uy). Since y ∼M x0
and x0Ru0, the (back) condition implies that there is a world uy such that uy ∼M u0 and yRuy
(and other properties that we will return to later). We will show that Cy ∈ C(y, uy). Let Z ′ be
such that uySyZ
′, and we are to prove that Cy ∩ Z ′ 6= ∅. The earlier instance of (back) condition
for uy further implies that there is a set Z with u0Sx0Z, and for all z ∈ Z there is z
′ ∈ Z ′ with
z ∼M z′. Let z ∈ Z ∩ Cx0 be an arbitrary element (which exists because, as we proved, Cx0 is a
choice set). So there is z′ ∈ Z ′ such that z′ ∼M z. Since [z] ∈ C, equivalently [z′] ∈ C, we have
z′ ∈ Cy. In particular, Z ′ ∩ Cy 6= ∅. Thus Cy ∈ C(y, uy).
Let us prove that there is a set U such that ‹U ⊆ V, [x]S˜[w]‹U and R˜[‹U ] ⊆ C. Let w
′ ∈ [w] and
y ∈ [x] be such that w′Ry. Since [u]S˜[w]V , there is a set Vw′,y such that uySw′Vw′,y andflVw′,y ⊆ V .
Applying (R)gen with Cy, there is Uw′,y ⊆ Vw′,y such that ySw′Uw′,y and R[Uw′,y] ⊆ Cy. Let
U =
⋃
w′∈[w],y∈[x],w′Ry Uw′,y. Clearly
‹U ⊆ V. Lemma 35 implies ‹U ⊆ R˜[[w]]. The definition of S˜[w]
implies [x]S˜[w]‹U .
It remains to verify that R˜[‹U ] ⊆ C. Let t ∈ U and z ∈ W be such that [t]R˜[z]. Then we have
t ∈ Uw′,y for some w′ ∈ [w] and y ∈ [x]. Since [t]R˜[z], there are t′ ∈ [t] and z′ ∈ [z] with t′Rz′. The
condition (forth) implies that there is z′′ such that tRz′′ and z′ ∼M z
′′. Since R[Uw′,y] ⊆ Cy) and
z′′ ∈ R[Uw′,y], we have z′′ ∈ Cy. Definition of Cy implies [z′′] ∈ C, or equivalently, [z] ∈ C.
Corollary 39. ILR is decidable.
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